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Attorney-Client Privilege: The Necessity
of Intent to Waive the Privilege in
Inadvertent Disclosure Cases
Privileged communication between client and attorney is considered
a necessity in contemporary society.' The attorney-client privilege per-
mits a client, whether or not a party to litigation, to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communica-
tion between the client and the attorney.' If the client is assured that
confidential communications will remain confidential, the client is more
likely to advise the attorney of all facts relevant to the client's situa-
tion. 3 Full disclosure ensures adequate legal representation of litigants
and encourages knowledge and compliance with the law by providing
the attorney with all facts necessary to advise the client.4 Therefore,
the privilege benefits clients, attorneys, and society as a whole.5
Because disadvantages are associated with the attorney-client
privilege, critics have argued for an abolition of the privilege.6 One
disadvantage in applying the privilege is that the trier of fact is pre-
cluded from viewing evidence relevant to the proceeding. 7 Another
concern is that individuals who are liable or guilty may invoke the
protection of the privilege to avoid penalty or punishment.8 Instead
of recommending abolition of the privilege, other commentators have
argued for a narrow application of the privilege.' Because the attorney-
1. 8 J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
2. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 954. The privilege is subject to several qualifications and limita-
tions. See infra notes 33-101 and accompanying text.
3. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 87, at 205 (E. Cleary 3d
ed. 1984).
4. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
5. See infra notes 388-44 and accompanying text. The attorney-client privilege has prompted
discussions between academicians as well. See generally, M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1980);
Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidence: One Value Among Many or a Categorical
Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REV. 349 (1981); Frankel, The Search for Truth Continued: More
Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (1982); Alschuler, The Search for Truth
'Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 67 (1982).
6. See, e.g., M. DUMONT, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, EXTRACTED FROM THE
MANUSCRIPTS OF JEREMY BENTHAM, 246-47 (London 1825).
7. See Article, Developments in the Law of Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1450, 1507 (1985).
8. See M. DUMONT, supra note 6, at 246-47.
9. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
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client privilege has a strong foundation in our legal system, the privilege
is unlikely to be abolished." The privilege may, however, be limited.
Liberal recognition of waiver is one means by which the privilege may
be limited. '" For example, if the client discloses a confidential com-
munication to a third person,' 2 the court may find that the attorney-
client privilege has been waived.' 3 Confidentiality would not be main-
tained since the client did not intend the communication to be con-
fidential.'4
One of the most troubling areas of conflict between proponents
and opponents of the privilege has involved cases of inadvertent
disclosure of confidential communications. Inadvertent disclosure issues
arise most often when an attorney seeks to introduce into evidence
a confidential communication between another attorney and client,
the confidentiality of which has been accidentally breached.' 5 After
an inadvertent disclosure, any assertion of the attorney-client privilege
may be met with the claim that the privilege was waived due to the
disclosure.' 6 The party opposing the privilege would argue that a waiver
has occurred despite the lack of intent by the client to waive the
privilege. 17
Courts faced with the issue of whether intent is necessary to effec-
tuate a waiver of the attorney-client privilege by inadvertent disclosure
have approached the problem in one of three ways. Some courts have
followed a "strict responsibility" approach, viewing the client's in-
tent as irrelevant.'" Other courts have used a balancing approach."'
10. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, § 87, at 206.
11. See infra notes 60-77 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
13. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 952 (definition of confidential communication); see also, Gonzales
v. Municipal Court, 67 Cal. App. 3d 111, 118, 136 Cal. Rptr. 475, 480 (1977) ("[l]f the com-
munication is made by the client in the open presence of a third party not present to further
the interest of the client in the consultation, it is not privileged.") (footnote omitted).
14. See Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954); see also infra
notes 182-99 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, 647 F.2d 18, 23
(9th Cir. 1981) (plaintiff acquired communications during the deposition of the defendant and
after being permitted to examine files that contained the communication); Suburban Sew 'N
Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 255-56 (N.D. I11. 1981) (plaintiffs acquired
documents by searching through trash dumpster of defendant for two years).
16. An alternative theory would be that nothing remains to be protected, since the documents
are no longer confidential. See Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, 91 F.R.D. at 257.
17. See, e.g., Weil, 647 F.2d at 23; Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, 91 F.R.D. at 257.
18. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (privilege was waived when a defendant failed to mark documents as privileged,
voluntarily turned them over, and explicitly advised plaintiff that other documents were in-
tended to be disclosed and not regarded as privileged); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United
States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970) (former attorney of the plaintiff
ordered to answer questions concerning a privileged letter).
19. See infra notes 163-224 and accompanying text.
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Under the balancing approach, several objective factors may be con-
sidered in rendering a decision. 20 A third group of courts has focused
specifically upon whether the client intended to waive the privilege.2"
Regardless of the approach used, the final determination of whether
an assertion of the attorney-client privilege will be upheld in an in-
advertent disclosure context depends upon whether the client either
expressly or impliedly waived the privilege.22 California courts have
not confronted directly the issue of whether intent is required to find
an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege in inadvertent
disclosure situations. Statutory law in California, however, may pro-
vide guidance in resolving the intent issue.2'
The purpose of this comment is to demonstrate that a client's in-
tent to waive the attorney-client privilege should be required to find
an implied waiver of the privilege due to the inadvertent disclosure
of privileged information. 4 The background of the attorney-client
privilege in the context of California statutory law will be detailed.25
This comment will analyze competing approaches to resolving inadver-
tent disclosure issues, and will discuss the undesirability of the
approaches that do not focus upon the client's intent to waive the
attorney-client privilege. 26 This comment will also examine California
Evidence Code section 912(a), the statute governing waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.27 A review of the legislative history of Evidence
20. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (documents of defendant inspected by plaintiff during discovery were still pri-
vileged since precautions of defendant were barely sufficient); Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, 91
F.R.D. at 260-61 (privilege waived since defendant did not take sufficient precautions to pro-
tect confidentiality from plaintiffs).
21. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(no waiver occurred when plaintiff's attorney unintentionally provided privileged documents
to defendant's attorney, but later refused to turn over, copies of the documents); Connecticut
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) (no waiver occurred when
plaintiffs were allowed to inspect privileged documents belonging to defendant, absent evidence
that defendant intended to waive the privilege).
22. See Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
82 MIcH. L. REv. 598, 598-600 (1983).
23. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 912(a). "[T]he right of any person to claim [the attorney-client
privilege] . . . is waived . . . if any holder of the privilege, without coercion, has disclosed
a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone.
." Id. Section 912(a) also applies to the marital communications privilege, the physician-
patient privilege, the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the penitent privilege, the clergyman
privilege, and the sexual assault victim-counselor privilege. See id. This comment will deal sole-
ly with the attorney-client privilege, and other privileges will be discussed only by analogy.
See infra notes 266-313 and accompanying text. Issues concerning the attorney's work product
privilege are beyond the scope of this comment.
24. See infra notes 31-344 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 102-17 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 118-224 and accompanying text.
27. CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a).
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Code section 912(a) will indicate that section 912(a) contains an im-
plied requirement of intent, a conclusion supported in studies by the
California Law Revision Commission."8 Finally, this comment will con-
clude that a requirement of corroborated subjective intent 9 promotes
the purpose and benefits of the attorney-client privilege, without in-
creasing the perceived disadvantages of the privilege." First, however,
an understanding of the general background of the attorney-client
privilege, and statutory treatment in California of the privilege, is
necessary before analyzing the difficult inadvertent disclosure issues.
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the confidential com-
munication privileges." The privilege is recognized in all United States
jurisdictions.3 2 While statutory formulations of the privilege vary from
state to state, the basic requirements are similar. Generally, a client
has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent other persons
from disclosing, confidential communications between the client and
attorney.33 The communication must relate to legal advice rendered
by the attorney as a legal advisor.34 Finally, the privilege must not
have been waived by the holder of the privilege.3"
Originally, the privilege only protected confidential communications
during the litigation in which they were made.36 The privilege gradually
28. See infra notes 254-65 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 227-41 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 314-44 and accompanying text.
31. H. MILSTEIN, ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE: COR-
PORATE APPLICATIONS, A-i (1980); 8 J. WIoMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542; Linklater,
Disclosure of Confidential Information Can Destroy the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Cm. B.
REC. 34, 36 (1984). The privilege appears generally to have been accepted as early as the 16th
century. 8 J. WxioMoRE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 542 n.l.
32. 3 B. JONES, EVIDENCE § 21:8 (Gard 6th ed. 1972).
33. In his treatise, Professor Wigmore formulated the following generally accepted defini-
tion of the privilege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554; see In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209, 211 (9th Cir.
1977) (using Wigmore's formulation of the attorney-client privilege). But see Clark v. State,
159 Tex. Crim. 187, 199, 261 S.W.2d 339, 342-43 (1953) (attorney-client privilege does not
extend to testimony regarding telephone conversation between attorney and client which is
overheard by a third party), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 855 (1953).
34. 8 J. WIMoRa, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554; see Fischel, 557 F.2d at 211.
35. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292, at 554; see Fischel, 557 F.2d at 211.
36. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2294, at 559.
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was expanded to cover all aspects of legal consultation.17 Limitations
on the privilege, however, do exist. Unprotected communications in-
clude an attorney's nonlegal advice, 38 communications concerning trans-
actions which could be performed as well by another agent, 39 and
advice sought to aid in the commission of criminal or fraudulent trans-
actions.4"
Privileged communications between the client and attorney must
relate to the purpose for which the attorney was consulted. 4 The com-
munication however, must be confidential. 2 Moreover, the client must
intend the communication to be confidential. 3 For example, if the
confidential communication is disclosed by the attorney or the client
to a third person," the communication probably would not be pri-
37. Id. See CAL. Evi. CODE § 952 (definition of confidential communication). The attorney-
client privilege now includes communications made in seeking legal advice for any purpose.
8 J. WiOMoRE, supra note 1, § 2294, at 560.
38. 8 J. WIoMoaE, supra note I, § 2294, at 559-65. See, e.g., Estate of Perkins, 195 Cal.
699, 710, 235 P. 45, 49 (1925) (attorney's business advice held admissible).
39. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2295-2297, at 565-72. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall,
140 Cal. App. 2d 475, 480, 295 P.2d 131, 134 (1956) (communications from client to attorney,
the latter serving as a notary public, were not privileged).
40. 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 1, § 2298, at 572-77. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 956
(crime or fraud exception to the lawyer-client privilege). See also id. §§ 956-62 (exceptions to
the lawyer-client privilege). Generally, advice protected by the privilege must come from an
attorney duly qualified to practice law. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2300, at 580-81. But
cf. CAL. EVrD. CODE § 950 (lawyer means a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation). A person must be licensed
to practice law in California. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6060. In addition, communica-
tions from the attorney must be rendered in the attorney's capacity as a legal advisor. 8 J.
WIoMoRE, supra note 1, § 2303, at 584. Communications between the clients and the agents
of the attorney are also privileged. Id. § 2301, at 583. Disclosure of communications to agents
of the attorney is often necessary. Id. See also CAL. EVID. CODE § 952. To satisfy the re-
quirements for a confidential communication, the client may not disclose the communication
to third persons other than those present to further the interest of the client, or those necessary
for transmission of the information. Id.
41. See, e.g., Hager v. Shindler, 29 Cal. 47, 67 (1856) (communication was not confiden-
tial when the client communicated to the attorney a fact unrelated to the purpose for which
the attorney was retained).
42. CAL. EviD. CODE § 952. If the client intends the communication to be confidential,
the privilege can attach to acts of the client witnessed by the attorney, and to the production
of documents. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2307, at 592-94. A client may not refuse to
disclose the fact that privileged documents were delivered to the attorney. The production of
the documents, however, may be excused due to the privileged status of the material within
the documents. If the client could be compelled to produce the documents, then the attorney
must produce those documents upon a court order, since the attorney is the agent of the client.
If the document is the client's communication, then it may be excluded from admission into
evidence. Id. Testimony concerning those documents can also be privileged. Id. §§ 2306-2309,
at 588-98. Testimony regarding the content of documents is within the privilege, while testimony
as to possession, execution, or existence of documents is generally not privileged. Id. §§ 2308-2309,
at 595-96.
43. See CAL. EviD. CODE § 952 (definition of confidential communication).
44. "Third persons" do not include agents of the attorney, or those persons present to
further the interest of the client. See infra notes 102-17 and accompanying text. See also CAL.
EVID. CODE § 952 (definition of confidential communication).
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vileged since confidentiality no longer exists." Although confidentiality
is presumed in California,", in other jurisdictions the burden of proof
is on the party objecting to the introduction of the communication.47
To qualify as privileged, the communication must originate from,
and be directed toward, either the client or the attorney. 48 Accord-
ingly, the attorney-client privilege can apply to communications sent
through an agent of either the client or the attorney.49 Communica-
tions originating with an agent of the client and made to the attorney
may also be privileged.50 Communications made by any other third
person are not privileged communications between client and attorney.'
The attorney-client privilege can be exercised and waived only by
the client. 52 An attorney may not exercise or waive the privilege unless
authorized by the client .5 Furthermore, the client need not be a party
to the litigation in which the privilege is invoked.54 For example, the
privilege could be asserted during litigation in which the client is not
a party, but merely a witness."
The privilege continues beyond the litigation,16 even after the death
of the client."' The personal representative of the client may assert
45. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2311, at 601-03; see Benge v. Superior Court, 131
Cal. App. 3d 336, 346, 182 Cal. Rptr. 275, 280 (1982) (a communication is not confidential
if made in the presence of third persons since the confidentiality is not preserved).
46. CAL. Evir. CODE § 917. Under Evidence Code § 917, when the attorney-client privilege
is claimed vis-a-vis a communication, the burden of proof is on the opponent of the privilege
to establish that the communication was not confidential. Id. See id. § 952.
47. 8 J. WiGmop, supra note 1, § 2311, at 599. A client may contact an attorney for
reasons other than those which would be privileged, so the burden of demonstrating the ex-
istence of the privilege should be on the party objecting to introduction of the communication.
See Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283, 286-89, 193 P. 571, 572-73 (1920). Contra CAL. EvID.
CODE § 917. Under Evidence Code § 917, when the attorney-client privilege is claimed vis-a-vis
a communication, the burden of proof is on the opponent of the privilege to establish that
the communication was not confidential. Id. See id. § 952.
48. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 954 (definition of attorney-client privilege), 951 (definition
of client); 8 J. VIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2317, at 618.
49. 8 J. WIoMORE, supra note 1, § 2317, at 618.
50. Id. at 618-19.
51. Id. §§ 2317-2320, at 618-29.
52. Id. § 2321, at 629.
53. See id. In California, the privilege may be claimed only by the holder of the privilege,
a person authorized by the holder to waive, or the lawyer at the time of the communication.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 954. The lawyer may only claim the privilege if a holder exists and the
attorney is not otherwise instructed by the holder. Id. A "holder of the privilege" means (1)
the client, (2) the client's guardian or conservator, (3) the personal representative of a deceased
client, or (4) a successor, assign, trustee in dissolution, or any similar representative of an
entity that is no longer in existence. Id. § 953.
54. 8 J. WIoMoRE, supra note 1, § 2321, at 629; CAL. EvID. CODE § 954.
55. See, e.g., People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 446, 277 P.2d 94, 100 (1954) (privilege
maintained despite allegation that witness was using the privilege to conceal the truth).
56. 8 J. WIoMoRE, supra note 1, § 2323, at 630.
57. Id. at 631.
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the privilege if the client is deceased. 8 A client also may assert the
privilege indirectly through an authorized representative, such as a
guardian or conservator.5 9
The attorney-client privilege, like all privileges, may be waived.6"
Since the privilege belongs only to the client, however, only the client
may waive the privilege. 6' Thus, an attorney cannot waive the privilege
without the client's consent. 62 Three justifications exist for recogniz-
ing a waiver of privileged communications. The first justification is
that since the privilege belongs to the client, the client may waive
the privilege.63 The client may believe that waiving the privilege is
the best course of action to take because the client has more to gain
than to lose through disclosure of the communication." The second
justification involves the client's desire for confidentiality. If evidence
is offered demonstrating that confidentiality is not intended, courts
often will find a waiver since the purpose behind the privilege no
longer would be served.65 The third justification for permitting a waiver
is dictated by fairness. 66 A client should not be allowed to disclose
the communication when disclosure is beneficial, and subsequently
invoke the privilege when disclosure becomes unfavorable. 67 To the
extent the privilege has been waived, it cannot be invoked subsequent-
ly. 68 If an adverse party relied on the disclosure in preparing the case
for trial, allowing the privilege could result in an injustice.
6 9
58. CAL. EvID. CODE § 953(c).
59. Id. § 953(b). A corporate client may also invoke the privilege. Id. § 953(d); Depart-
ment of Pub. Works v. Glen Arms Estate, Inc., 230 Cal. App. 2d 841, 856, 41 Cal. Rptr.
303, 311 (1964) (privilege is the same for corporations as for natural persons). See generally
H. MILSTEIN, supra note 31, at A-l; Annot., 98 A.L.R. 2d 241 (1964) (right of a corporation
to assert the attorney-client privilege).
60. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2327-2329, at 634-41. See also CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 912(a) (waiver of privilege).
61. 8 J. WioMoRE, supra note 1, § 2327, at 634-35 (waiver belongs solely to the client).
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a).
62. 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 802. At times, courts will find an implied
consent of the client to the attorney's waiver, particularly when the disclosure was for the
client's benefit in negotiations on his behalf. See, e.g., Klang v. Shell Oil Co., 17 Cal. App.
3d 933, 938, 95 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268 (1971).
63. C. McCoRmCK, supra note 3, § 93, at 223.
64. See Note, supra note 22, at 609.
65. Article, Limitations on California Professional Privileges: Waiver Principles and the
Policies They Promote, 9 U.C.D. L. REv. 477, 498. See also 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, §
21:22, at 802; 8 J. WIGMom, supra note 1, § 2327, at 634. Resolution of inadvertent disclosure
issues turns on whether the client has demonstrated that confidentiality was not intended. See
infra notes 118-313 and accompanying text. Depending on the approach followed, a particular
act may or may not demonstrate that confidentiality is not intended. See id.
66. G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION To THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 91 (1978).
67. See 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 803.
68. See Article, supra note 65, at 498.
69. For example, if a party relies on a waiver of the privilege in preparing for trial, an
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The attorney-client privilege may be waived expressly or impliedly.7 °
For example, courts in many jurisdictions have held that waiver of
the privilege in one trial acts as an implied waiver of that privilege
in subsequent litigation.7 ' The authority to waive the privilege can
also be implied.7 Authority to waive the privilege is implied when
a party or that party's attorney testifies regarding a privileged com-
munication," and when the privilege is waived by the representative
of a deceased client or by the guardian ad litem of an incompetent.74
The privilege usually is not waived merely because a client brings an
action in which confidential matter is relevant. 7" Nor is the privilege
lost in a subsequent trial if the client was forced to disclose the con-
fidential communication in previous litigation erroneously. 76 If a court
determines that the privilege has been waived, however, the waiver
is irrevocable despite a client's lack of intent to waive the privilege.77
B. Policy Considerations Behind the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege furthers important policy goals by en-
couraging complete disclosure of all facts relevant to the client's case.78
Originally, the privilege belonged to the attorney on the ground that
the attorney had taken a solemn oath of secrecy, so any disclosure
of the client's confidence would be dishonorable. 79 The rationale based
upon protection of the attorney's honor eventually was replaced. Today
the justification for the privilege is to enable the client to consult
assertion of the privilege at trial would prejudice the party opposing assertion. See, e.g., In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 604 F.2d at 675 ("[I]t would be unfair and unrealistic now to
permit the privilege's assertion as to these documents which have been thoroughly examined
and used by the Government for years.").
70. 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 803.
71. Id. See, e.g., Agnew v. Superior Court, 156 Cal. App. 2d 838, 841, 320 P.2d 158,
160 (1958) (client testified to a confidential communication during prior litigation).
72. See 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 803-04.
73. Id. at 804.
74. Id. at 803-04; see 8 J. WiGMoRE, supra note 1, § 2329, at 639-41; see also CAL. EVID.
CODE § 953(b), (c) ("holders" includes decedents' representatives and guardians of incompetents).
See generally Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 1268 (1959) (waiver of the attorney-client privilege by a
decedent's representative or by the guardian of an incompetent).
75. 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 805. When the client brings an action in which
confidential matter is relevant, the privilege generally will be waived only if the client has placed
the conduct of the attorney, or the attorney's state of mind, in issue. Article, supra note 65,
at 518-19.
76. 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 804 n.14; CAi. EVID. CODE § 919.
77. Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 648, 343 P.2d 769, 773 (1959) ("[O]nce
the privilege is waived it is gone for good."); 3 B. JONES, supra note 32, § 21:22, at 803.
78. See infra notes 314-35 and accompanying text (discussion of policy considerations behind
the attorney-client privilege).
79. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 543. This rationale is often referred to as
the "point of honor" rationale. Id.
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with an attorney free from any apprehensions concerning disclosures
of the client's confidences. 0 In our complicated society, governed by
complex and detailed laws, expert legal advice is essential.8' To furnish
sound legal advice, an attorney must receive honest communications
given freely by the client.82 If concerned about future disclosures, a
client is unlikely to inform the attorney of all relevant information.
83
Thus, the attorney-client privilege is a recognition of the necessity
for easing any apprehensions in the client's mind that could other-
wise inhibit consultations with the attorney. 4
Most commentators and judges agree that the attorney-client privilege
is beneficial to our legal system.85 The benefits, however, are sometimes
not as apparent as the costs. A short-term cost of exercising the
attorney-client privilege is the suppression of relevant evidence.
86
Because of this short-term cost, many courts have stated that the
privilege should be defined narrowly.87 The loss of relevant evidence
due to an exercise of the attorney-client privilege, however, is rather
small. 8 Moreover, since the privilege induces the client to disclose
facts that may be useful to the case, the interests of justice are also
furthered. 9 Thus, society benefits from the existence of the privilege.90
The attorney-client privilege has been criticized on the ground that
the privilege essentially abets only unlawful conduct, since an inno-
cent client would not fear disclosure of any communication.' In civil
cases, however, often no clear line can be drawn between right and
80. Id. See also, e.g., People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 690, 631 P.2d 46, 51, 175
Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (1981) (the fundamental purpose of the privilege is to encourage full and
open communication between client and attorney). One consequence of this theory is that the
privilege no longer is thought to be held by the attorney. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290,
at 544. Rather, as previously stated, the privilege belongs solely to the client. Id.
81. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 210, Comment (1942).
82. Id.
83. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 579, 593, 113
Cal. Rptr. 561, 572 (1974) (purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage full, free,
and open disclosure, and withholding the privilege is "morally reprehensible").
84. 8 J. WIGMoRs, supra note 1, § 2290, at 543.
85. See infra notes 325-44 and accompanying text.
86. See 8 J. \VIGMoRa, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
87. Id. See, e.g., Merritt v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 721, 730, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337,
342-43 (1970) (privilege is to be strictly construed). But see, e.g., People v. Flores, 71 Cal.
App. 3d 559, 563, 139 Cal. Rptr. 546, 548 (1977) ("Although it has been suggested to the
contrary, the privilege has been and should be liberally construed.").
88. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554. "It is evident that the disclosure of
his [the client's] admissions to his attorney would add little to the proof except so far as the
client is a person capable of perjuring himself when interrogated in court." Id.
89. Id.
90. See also infra notes 314-44 and accompanying text.
91. M. DUMONT, supra note 6, at 246-47.
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wrong.92 Rarely are all the circumstances and practices on one side
clearly and completely correct.93 Likewise, the case of the opposition
is rarely completely devoid of merit. 94 A client could have a valid
claim despite the fact that he or she was not completely blameless."
Thus, the criticism that the attorney-client privilege aids only wrongful
conduct is invalid.
Criminal defendants have additional rights and interests which are
protected by the attorney-client privilege.96 Critics of the attorney-
client privilege have suggested that the privilege enables an attorney
to further a client's illegal conduct by preserving the confidentiality
of communications between the client and attorney. 97 The fear that
an attorney will aid a client in illegal conduct by concocting a false
defense, however, does not weigh against the existence of the attorney-
client privilege since communications in furtherance of illegal activity
are not privileged. 98
While the attorney-client privilege is universally accepted, slight varia-
tions exist among the jurisdictions.99 In California, the attorney-client
privilege is codified in Evidence Code section 954. 00 Several other
sections of the Evidence Code also affect the privilege."0 ' California
codification of the privilege will therefore be examined briefly.
STATUTORY TREATMENT IN CALIFORNIA
The California Legislature first recognized the attorney-client




96. 3 B. JONEs, supra note 32, § 21:8, at 763.
97. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 553.
98. Id. While exceptions exist, attorneys generally do not aid clients in the perpetuation
of unjust causes or illegal activity. See id. Either the attorney declines to accept the case, per-
suades the client the case has no merit and is hopeless, or attempts a settlement for the client
to the extent the cause has merit. Id. Of course, some attorneys will be more creative in finding
merit in a particular client's cause. In doing so, however, the attorney is acting as a strong
advocate for the client, and this should not be regarded as a vice. To the extent the attorney
is aiding the client in illegal conduct, the attorney-client privilege would not protect communica-
tions between the attorney and client, due to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege. Id. Allowing clients with unjust causes freedom of consultation with an attorney is
only an evil to the extent that the practicing bar is unprincipled, in which case more drastic
remedies are needed than denial of the privilege. Id.
99. Although California law generally is in accord with the previous textual discussion,
differences exist between the privilege generally and California codification of the privilege.
Compare supra notes 31-98 and accompanying text with CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 911-19, 950-62.
100. CAL. EvrD. CODE § 954.
101. See CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 911-920, 950-962; see also infra notes 102-17 and accompany-
ing text.
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privilege in 1872.102 Between 1872 and 1965, attempts were made to
reform California evidence law.' 3 The main impetus behind these at-
tempted reforms was to promote predictability by the courts in deciding
evidentiary issues.' °0 Despite the failure of earlier reform efforts, the
California Legislature adopted the California Evidence Code in 1965.10°
The code, while making some significant changes in evidence law,
was essentially a restatement of existing California evidence law, in-
cluding the provisions relating to the attorney-client privilege.
10 6
The California Evidence Code lists three requirements for a client
to refuse or prevent disclosure of a confidential communication be-
tween the client and lawyer.'0 7 First, the privilege must be claimed
by (1) the holder of the privilege, (2) a person authorized to claim
the privilege by the holder, or (3) the holder's attorney.' 8 An at-
torney cannot claim the privilege if no holder exists or the attorney
is instructed otherwise by a person authorized to permit disclosure.' 0 9
Second, the person allowed to claim the privilege must not have waived
the privilege."10 Finally, no applicable exceptions to exercising the
privilege may exist."'
102. CAL. Cr¢. PROC. CODE § 1881(2) (enacted in 1872; repealed by 1965 Cal. Stat. ch.
299, § 64, at 1361). Part IV of the original Civil Procedure Code dealt with evidence law.
California Law Revision Commission, Recommendation Proposing An Evidence Code, 7 CAL.
L. REVISION CoMM'N REPORTS 29 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Recommendation].
103. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
104. See Recommendation, supra note 102, at 30.
105. A substantial revision of the evidence portions of the Civil Procedure Code was made
in 1901, but was held unconstitutional since the enactment covered more than one subject,
and because of deficiencies in the title of the enactment. Id. at 30. The California Code Com-
mission began another revision in 1932, but this was abandoned when the American Law In-
stitute began working on the Model Code of Evidence, later rejected in California. Id. at 31-32.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence were the next national attempt at evidence law reform. Although
accepted by some other jurisdictions, in 1965 the California Law Revision Commission recom-
mended against adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Id. at 33 (stating the reasons for
not recommending the Uniform Rules of Evidence). Instead, the Commission recommended
a new Evidence Code for California. Id. at 34.
106. Id. at 34. California Evidence Code §§ 911-920 relate to privileges generally, with §
912 permitting waiver. See CAL. Evm. CODE §§ 911-20. Sections 950-53 are definitions ap-
plicable to the attorney-client privilege. See id. §§ 950-53. The statute specifically providing
for the privilege is found at § 954, and the exceptions to this privilege are contained in §§
956-62. See id. §§ 954, 956-62. Section 955 states when an attorney is required to claim the
privilege. See id. § 955.
107. Id. § 954.
108. Id. § 954(a), (b), (c). See also id. §§ 950 (definition of lawyer), 951 (definition of
client), 953 (definition of confidential communication). A holder of the privilege includes a
client; a client's guardian or conservator; a deceased client's personal representative; or a suc-
cessor, assignee, bankruptcy trustee, or similar representative of a client no longer in existence.
Id. § 953. The claimant of the privilege need not be a party to the litigation. Id. § 954.
109. Id. § 954(c).
110. Id. § 954. Waiver is defined in § 912 of the Evidence Code. Id. § 912.
Ill. Id. § 954. The exceptions to the privilege include situations in which the attorney's
services were sought to further a crime or fraud, when the communication pertains to an issue
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The legislature has provided specific provisions for waiver of the
attorney-client privilege." 2 The privilege is waived if the holder, without
coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication sought
to be protected, or has consented to disclosure by anyone." 3 Consent
may be manifested by statements or conduct indicating consent to
disclose."" Conduct manifesting intent includes the failure to claim
the privilege in any proceeding in which the holder had the oppor-
tunity to assert the privilege.' ,S Furthermore, the scope of the waiver
is defined by the extent of the act that causes the waiver." 6 With
a disclosure, for example, the privilege usually is waived only for that
portion of the communication divulged." 7
The universal acceptance of the attorney-client privilege is illustrative
of the importance that society ascribes to the existence of the privilege.
The attorney-client privilege should be construed broadly within the
limitations applied to the privilege, and courts should find a waiver
only under compelling circumstances. Cases involving the inadvertent
disclosure of privileged communications directly confront issues of
waiver, and pose potential problems for the attorney-client privilege.
INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE AS A WAIVER OF THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE-COMPETING APPROACHES
One situation in which the issue of implied waiver may arise occurs
between parties all of whom claim through a deceased client, when the issue pertains to a
breach of duty arising out of the attorney-client relationship, when the issue pertains to the
client's intent or competence in executing an attested document of which the attorney is the
attesting witness, when the issue pertains to the intent of the client with respect to a writing
affecting an interest in property, when the issue pertains to the validity of a writing affecting
an interest in property, or when two or more clients have the same attorney in a matter of
common interest. Id. §§ 956-62.
112. See id. § 912.
113. Id. § 912(a).
114. Id.
115. Id. See Mize v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 46 Cal. App. 3d 436, 445-48, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 787, 794-96 (1975) (attorney-client privilege was waived when counsel did not object to
use of potentially privileged documents). See also Cope v. Cope, 230 Cal. App. 2d 218, 235,
40 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (1964) (failure to object to testimony of an attorney or physician waives
the attorney-client or physician-patient privilege); infra notes 254-313 and accompanying text
(discussing whether the client's intent to waive the attorney-client and physician-patient privileges
is required).
116. Article, supra note 65, at 520; see 8 J. WIvoMoR, supra note 1, § 2327, at 634-38.
117. See Article, supra note 65, at 520. For example, if a communication discussed the
client's pending divorce and a business lease, but the disclosure was limited to portions of
the correspondence pertaining to the lease, only those portions relating to the lease lose privileged
status. Id. at 521. Once part of a privileged communication is waived, all other communica-
tions relating to the matter in that part of the communication lose privileged status. See id.
at 520. If the client places in issue the privileged matter, the scope of waiver may be more
extensive. Id. at 521; see id. at 518-20 (waiver by placing attorney-client communications in issue).
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when confidential communications are inadvertently disclosed. Whether
the client has impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege depends
upon the significance given to the intent of the client to waive the
privilege by disclosing the communication." 8 Courts have placed vary-
ing levels of importance upon the client's intent to waive when analyz-
ing whether an implied waiver of the privilege has occurred." 9 Some
courts have opted for a "strict responsibility" approach. 20 The in-
tent of the client is irrelevant if this approach is followed. '2 Other
courts have used an approach that requires an analysis of all cir-
cumstances surrounding disclosure of the communication.'22 Under
this second approach, some courts consider the intent of the client
to waive the privilege in their analysis of the circumstances, but in-
tent alone is never dispositive.' 23 The third approach focuses upon
the client's intent to waive the privilege by disclosure of the com-
munication.'24 The shortcomings of the strict responsibility and cir-
cumstances analysis approaches lead to the conclusion that the focus
of courts deciding inadvertent disclosure issues should be the intent
of the client to waive the privilege.
A. The Strict Responsibility Approach
Application of the strict responsibility approach to issues of waiver
through inadvertent disclosure was advocated by Professor Wigmore 125
Under Wigmore's view, the confidential communication has been
granted protected status by the legal system.'26 The law, however,
cannot guarantee confidentiality of communications between the client
and attorney.'27 The client, therefore, must ensure that sufficient pro-
tective measures are taken against the occurrence of inadvertent
disclosure. 28 In addition, Wigmore stated that if intent is the main
factor in determining whether a waiver has occurred in inadvertent
disclosure cases, a person would seldom be found to have waived
the privilege.' 29 A court would have to place great weight on the client's
118. See Note, supra note 22, at 610 ("Modern courts agree that the test should focus
on the client's intent to maintain confidentiality . . ").
119. See infra notes 125-214 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 125-62 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. See infra notes 163-224 and accompanying text.
123. Id.
124. See infra notes 225-344 and accompanying text.
125. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2326, at 633.
126. Id. The protected status is conferred by the attorney-client privilege. See id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 2327, at 636.
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testimony concerning the intent to waive the privilege, which could
be biased due to the strong self-interest of the client .
30
In Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,' 3' a federal
district court applied the strict responsibility approach and refused
to protect an otherwise privileged letter accidentally disclosed to the
adverse party. 32 During the litigation, the plaintiff inadvertently pro-
duced a letter from the plaintiff's prior attorney for inspection by
the defendant. 33 Plaintiff's prior attorney later refused to answer ques-
tions relating to the letter, relying on the attorney-client privilege. 
34
The plaintiff claimed that disclosure of his prior attorney's letter was
inadvertent.' 31 Since no intent to waive the privileged status of the
document was present, plaintiff argued that no waiver should be
found.'3 , The court, however, refused to look beyond the objective
fact of disclosure in finding that waiver had occurred. 37 Whether the
plaintiff actually had intended the disclosure was found irrelevant.' 38
The court reasoned that the confidentiality of the letter had been
breached. 39 Moreover, the breach destroyed any basis for allowing
the privilege, since confidentiality is a prerequisite to the existence
of the privilege. 40
Two bases have been put forth in support of the strict responsibil-
ity approach.'' The first rationale is that the client and the attorney
have the ability to preserve the secrecy of the documents.'42 Any
130. See id.
131. 314 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1970).
132. Id. at 549.
133. Id. at 547. The letter was presented by the plaintiff pursuant to a consent order for
examination of certain documents by the defendant. Id. at 548-49. The letter was inadvertently
placed among the documents listed in the order. See id. at 549.
134. Id. at 547.





140. Id. "[W]here the policy underlying the rule can no longer be served, it would amount
to no more than mechanical obedience to a formula to continue to recognize it." Id. (quoting
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954)). The deci-
sion of the court also was significant in terms of future litigation, since allowing use of a
document concerning one subject permits use of all communications on the same subject. See
Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank, 103 F.R.D. 52, 67 (D.D.C. 1984). One commen-
tator has suggested that Underwater Storage did not create an absolute rule that inadvertent
disclosure results in an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The fact that the plain-
tiff did not assert the privilege prior to disclosure, and took no precautions to prevent disclosure,
was thought to be significant. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied Waiver Through
Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. M mai L. REV. 511, 520 (1985).
141. Note, supra note 22, at 607.
142. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976)
(defendant could have taken the steps necessary to protect confidentiality).
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disclosure is thought indicative of a lack of intent to maintain con-
fidentiality.'4 3 If the client and the attorney genuinely desire confiden-
tiality, measures may be taken to ensure that confidentiality is pre-
served.'1 4 The client must bear the responsibility for the failure to
take the precautionary measures, and therefore the privilege is waiv-
ed. 4 5 If the attorney makes an inadvertent disclosure, the mistake
would be chargeable to the client.',
This first basis, however, has been criticized repeatedly as too
harsh.'4 7 The objective fact of disclosure alone does not necessarily
demonstrate that a client did not intend confidentiality, especially when
factors such as theft, electronic surveillance, or erroneously compell-
ed disclosure are taken into consideration.' 8 While these circumstances
do not involve direct disclosure by the client or the attorney, follow-
ing a strict responsibility approach could cause the disclosure to be
attributed to a lack of sufficient precautions.' 4 9 If the strict respon-
sibility approach is followed, the privilege would be waived indirect-
ly.'' In response to criticism, some courts have modified adherence
to the strict responsibility approach. 5 ' In California, the Evidence
Code does not allow a waiver if disclosure was due to theft, elec-
tronic surveillance, or erroneously compelled disclosure.' 52
The second basis asserted in favor of the strict responsibility
approach is that once a privileged document has been disclosed,
precluding use at trial would amount to no more than mechanical
obedience to a formula. 3 Since the confidentiality of the document
has been lost after a disclosure, the purpose behind the privilege is
143. See id.; Note, supra note 22, at 607.
144. See W.R. Grace & Co., 446 F. Supp. at 775; Note, supra note 22, at 607.
145. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
146. Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549.
147. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8 ("[the doctrine generates] harsh results
out of all proportion to the mistake of inadvertent disclosure."); Grippando, supra note 140,
at 516 ("[Tihe trend is for courts to retreat from the strict responsibility standard."); Note,
supra note 22, at 607-10 ("[Clommentators have abandoned the traditional approach.").
148. Note, supra note 22, at 608.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 608 n.40, 612-16.
152. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 919 (erroneously compelled disclosure of a privileged com-
munication does not constitute a waiver). See also California Law Revision Commission, Evidence
Code with Official Comments, 7 CAL. L. REVIsION COMM'N REPORTS 1167 (1965) (text of Evidence
Code § 954 with official comments that clients are protected against the risk of disclosure
by eavesdroppers and other wrongful interceptors) [hereinafter cited as Evidence Code Comments].
153. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. Mich. 1954)
(privilege was waived since Government had been allowed to inspect privileged documents and
make photostatic copies); Note, supra note 22, at 608.
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no longer served.' 4 Thus, the client would receive no benefit from
use of the document at trial.'" This conclusion, however, is by no
means compelled. If the privileged communication is damaging, the
client clearly benefits when the communication is excluded from
evidence, despite the fact that complete confidentiality is no longer
possible.'56 If the information is embarrassing, the client's privacy
rights are protected since the embarrassing information is not made
public.'57 Moreover, the maintenance of the privilege in on-going litiga-
tion also preserves the privilege for future litigation, thereby benefiting
the client again.' 8 Finally, adverse parties often will stipulate that
inadvertent disclosure will not constitute a waiver.' 9 These stipula-
tions show that both sides may benefit by maintaining the privilege
despite disclosure, which a strict responsibility approach might not
allow.' 6 1 Therefore, exclusion of inadvertently disclosed communica-
tions benefits the client in many respects.
The modern trend is away from the strict responsibility approach,
as indicated by proposed rule 503 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Rule 503, approved by the United States Supreme Court but not
adopted by Congress, stated in part that "communication is confiden-
tial if not intended to be disclosed to third persons . . . ." (emphasis
added).' 6 ' The language of rule 503 reflects the prevailing attitude
of most modern courts to abandon the strict responsibility approach
in favor of other approaches, including the analysis of circumstances
approach. 
6 1
154. Note, supra note 22, at 608.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court
Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 110-11 (1956) ("Primarily [privileges] . . . are a right to be
let alone, or a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships .... ).
In recent years, society has attached increasing importance to an individual's privacy interests.
Article, supra note 65, at 480. See also CAL. CONST. art. I, § I ("All people are by nature
free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are ... pursuing and obtaining
safety, happiness, and privacy.").
158. See Note, supra note 22, at 609.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 609-10; see, e.g., Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1216 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (stipulation that disclosure would not constitute waiver was allowed); cf. United
States v. Aronoff, 466 F. Supp. 855, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (court stated that the attorneys
could have sought a stipulation to avoid inadvertent waiver). Some courts, however, refuse
to recognize such stipulations. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co., 446 F. Supp. at 775.
161. Deleted Fed. R. Evid. 503(a)(4), 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-36 (1973). Since rule 503 was
not adopted by Congress, the rule is not binding on the federal courts. However, approval
by the Supreme Court demonstrates that modern courts are abandoning the strict responsibility
approach which regards intent as irrelevant. See id. California Evidence Code § 954 also re-
quires intent that the communication not be disclosed to third persons. CA. EvID. CoDE § 954.
162. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. Rule 511 of the Proposed Federal Rules
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B. Analysis of Circumstances Approach
A second mode of analysis for courts confronted with inadvertent
disclosure issues is an analysis of the circumstances approach.' 63 Under
this approach, a court will review the totality of the circumstances
to determine whether an individual has waived the attorney-client
privilege through an inadvertent disclosure.' 64 In making the deter-
mination, courts have considered factors such as the fact of in-
advertence, unique circumstances, and the steps taken to ensure con-
fidentiality. 65 Intent is a consideration for some, but not all, courts
applying the analysis of circumstances approach.' 66 In three signifi-
cant cases, the courts have applied the analysis of circumstances
approach. 167 The decisions are all from federal courts, and are not
binding on California courts.' 6s The decisions are, however, illustrative
of this method of analyzing inadvertent disclosure issues.'
69
1. Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines
Corp.
In Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Machines
Corp.,'7" the defendant, IBM, had been compelled in prior litigation
to produce for inspection seventeen million pages of documents within
a three-month period. 7' IBM screened the documents for privileged
of Evidence deals with waiver through voluntary disclosure. See Deleted Fed. R. Evid. 511,
56 F.R.D. 183, 258 (1973). The Advisory Committee to the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence felt that knowledge of the existence of the privilege was irrelevant. Id. at 259 (Ad-
visory Committee note). Rule 511, however, was not adopted by Congress, due primarily to
the controversial nature of the rule. See 21 C. WRIGHT & GRAHM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5006 (1977). Although neither Rule 503 nor Rule 511 was adopted by Congress,
modern courts have followed the approach of Rule 503. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955
n.8 (specifically adopting the approach of Rule 503). Rule 511 has not received similar judicial
acceptance. See 21 C. WRIGr & GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5006 (1977).
Thus, unlike Rule 503, Rule 511 should not be taken as indicative of any modein trend among
the courts.
163. See infra notes 170-224 and accompanying text.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Chubb, 103 F.R.D. at 67 (waiver found due in part to inadvertent document
inspection); Transamerica, 573 F.2d at 651 (unique circumstances involving large amounts of
documents prevented waiver); Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, 91 F.R.D. at 259 (steps to ensure con-
fidentiality); Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465 (steps to ensure confidentiality).
166. See infra notes 170-214 and accompanying text.
167. See id.
168. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876) (federal courts have no power over
state courts, except when the Federal Constitution or laws are involved). The decisions discuss-
ed in the text were not decided under the Federal Rules of Evidence concerning the attorney-
client privilege (Rule 503), or voluntary disclosure of confidential communications (Rule 511),
since these rules were not adopted by Congress.
169. See infra notes 215-24 and accompanying text.
170. 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
171. Id. at 648.
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communications,'7" but 1138 privileged documents were produced for
inspection inadvertently. ' 7 Later, in the subsequent litigation, Trans-
america wanted IBM to produce these documents again, arguing that
the original disclosure, although inadvertent, waived any connected
privilege. ' 7 The court of appeals noted several factors in determining
that the privilege had not been waived.'
Although IBM had not been directly forced to produce the privileged
documents during the prior litigation, the accelerated discovery
proceedings' 76 achieved essentially the same result.'77 IBM would not
have produced the privileged documents had the discovery program
proceeded under a less demanding schedule.' 78 The court held disclosure
of the documents had therefore been indirectly compelled, and no
waiver had occurred. 7 9 The extraordinary order deprived IBM of an
opportunity to claim the privilege, since ensuring that all privileged
documents would be spotted by the screening process was virtually
impossible."10 Additionally, the appellate court noted that the judge
who issued the order for production had ruled that no waiver had
occurred.' 8' The court in Transamerica did not refer to intent as a
factor in their analysis.
2. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co.
In United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., " a district court, in
rejecting a claim of the attorney-client privilege, refused to consider
the intent of the party claiming the privilege. "' In Kelsey-Hayes, the
defendant was asked by the Justice Department to allow examination
of company files.' 84 The reason for the request was to investigate
alleged antitrust violations.' The defendant quickly agreed to the
172. The documents which IBM had to inspect were not grouped together, and were con-
tained in copious files strewn throughout various IBM branch offices and divisional headquarters.
Since each of the 17 million pages had to be examined, and time was short, IBM was forced
to turn to outside attorneys and clerks, who were unfamiliar with IBM's business and lacked
the motivation and competence that full-time IBM employees would have had. Id. The court
also described the "herculean effort" of IBM, and IBM's screening process. See id. at 648-49.
173. Id. at 650.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 650-52.
176. See supra notes 171-72 and accompanying text.
177. 573 F.2d at 651-52.
178. id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 652.
131. Id.
182. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954).
183. Id. at 465.
184. Id. at 464.
185. Id.
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request.'86 The Government copied approximately 1000 documents from
the defendant's voluminous files.'17 Twenty-nine of the disclosed
documents contained privileged information.' 8 Subsequently, the
Government requested that the defendant admit to the genuineness
of the copied documents. 8 9 The defendant admitted that all of the
documents were genuine except the twenty-nine that were privileged. 90
The defendant claimed that due to the size of the files and the
short time involved, the privileged documents could not have been
located in time to prevent inadvertent disclosure.' 9 ' The district court
was unpersuaded by defendant's arguments.' 9 " The court held that
privileged documents had been indiscriminately mingled with other
documents, and considered insufficient precautions a significant factor
in the decision to deny the privilege. 93 The court further reasoned
that since the confidentiality of the documents had been violated, the
privilege had to cease.'94 Finally, the court concluded that even if
the privilege were recognized, enabling the defendant to refuse to ad-
mit the genuineness of the documents, the Government could still of-
fer the copies of the documents at trial.' 95 From the copies, the Govern-
ment could attempt to prove genuineness.' 9 Since recognizing the
privilege would not serve the purpose behind the privilege,' 97 and would
result in laborious and time-consuming efforts for the Government
at trial, the court refused to recognize the privilege. 98 The court in








191. Id. at 465.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 464-65. "[W]here the policy underlying the rule can no longer be served, it
would amount to no more than mechanical obedience to a formula to continue to recognize
it." Id. at 465. The court considered this point universally conceded. Id. at 464 (quoting 8
J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2311, at 600 (3d ed. 1940)).
195. Id. at 465.
196. Id. This reasoning, however, is unsound. The court could have recognized the pri-
vileged status of the documents, and refused to consider them in the litigation. See Transamerica,
573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978). This exclusionary rule would work within the controlled environ-
ment of the courtroom. Id.
197. The purpose is to protect the confidentiality of the communication. See supra notes
78-98 and accompanying text; infra notes 317-35 and accompanying text.
198. Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465.
199. Id.
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3. Data Systems of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philips Business
Systems, Inc.
Data Systems of New Jersey, Inc. v. Philips Business Systems, Inc.2"'
is an example of a decision in which the court considered the intent
to waive the attorney-client privilege a relevant factor. In Data Systems,
plaintiffs20' prepared a report providing their counsel with the method
used in computing the damages sought against the defendant.20 2 The
plaintiffs were asked during discovery to produce certain files for in-
spection. 203 These files were sent by the plaintiffs to their counsel. 04
Counsel reviewed the files for privileged documents, and removed the
report. 205 The portion of the report showing the method of computa-
tion, however, had been detached and was produced inadvertently. 216
When opposing counsel sought to ask questions concerning the docu-
ment at a deposition, plaintiffs' counsel asserted the attorney-client
privilege, and. advised the plaintiff not to answer the questions.2 7
At a pretrial hearing to resolve various discovery disputes, the court
noted that some courts have not considered intent to waive the privilege
as a factor in determining the existence of waiver. 2 8 Applying a
"predominate theme of fairness" standard derived from other inadver-
tent disclosure cases, 209 however, the court sustained the privilege.210
The court considered the enormous volume of documents screened
for privileged material,21 ' the precautions taken by counsel,' 2 and
the timely reassertion of the privilege by counsel. 2 '3 The court also
200. No. 78 Civ. 6015-CSH, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. January 8, 1981) (available on LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file).
201. The suit involved 13 plaintiffs, each of whom were former corporate agents of the





206. Two paralegals had detached the report, since the report did not appear to be a privileged'





211. The court noted that thousands of files had to be screened. Id.
212. "[E]very possible precaution was taken to remove privileged documents." Id.
213. Id. When the report was introduced at the deposition, plaintiffs' counsel immediately
objected:
MR. SPINOGATTI: [L]et me just note an objection for purposes of the record.
This document was prepared by Mr. Beazley at the request of counsel. How it found
its way into the documents which were produced earlier this week to you right now
escapes me, but it was certainly not meant to be in there. Please note for your pur-
poses, since you have seen the document already, that we are not waiving any objec-
tion with respect to this document as to attorney work product or privileged com-
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noted that no intent was present on the part of the plaintiffs to waive
the privilege. 21 4 Thus, although the courts in Kelsey-Hayes and Data
Systems both used the analysis of circumstances approach, the court
in Kelsey-Hayes found intent to waive the privilege to be irrelevant
in determining whether waiver occurred. The court in Data Systems
found the lack of intent to be significant in holding that no waiver
occurred.
4. Problems Raised by the Analysis of Circumstances
Approach
The circumstances analysis approach is applied on a case-by-case
basis. Any factor the court considers relevant to the client's intent
to waive the privilege might be considered, and different courts may
give the same factor different weight. 2's Courts using this approach
usually focus upon factors surrounding the disclosure, the precau-
tions taken to protect the privilege, and the attorney's reassertion of
the privilege.21 6 While the analysis of circumstances balancing approach
has been used by a number of courts, the approach is unsatisfac-
tory.217 In Transamerica, Kelsey-Hayes, and Data Systems, the party
claiming the privilege inadvertently disclosed the privileged document
at least partially because of the tremendous number of documents
involved. 218 The courts, however, were able to either allow or deny
the privilege depending upon the emphasis placed upon a particular
munications .... [after other questions concerning the report had been asked] Mr.
O'Neill [for defendants], I am going to object to all questions having to do with
Defendants' Exhibit 2 on the ground of attorney-client privilege and on the ground
of work product. . . . It should not have been produced to you and I will object
to any questions with respect to this document.
MR. O'NEILL: [I] want it clear on the record that your objections are invalid.
I think you stated that you did not prepare this. Mr. Beazley prepared this.
MR. SPINOGATTI: That's right, at my request.
MR. O'NEILL: He is not an attorney.
MR. SPINOGATTI: So what? It is also attorney-client privilege, privileged com-
munications [sic]. I mentioned that.
MR. O'NEILL: I am going to put my questions on the record and you make
your objections.
Id. These objections are important in view of the significance many courts attach to a timely
assertion of the privilege. See Grippando, supra note 140, at 526.
214. Data Systems, No. 78 Civ. 6015-CSH. The court ordered the document returned to
the plaintiffs, and further ordered that the defendants could not base any questions to the
plaintiffs on the information obtained from previous examination of the document. Id.
215. See supra notes 163-214 and accompanying text.
216. Grippando, supra note 140, at 514-15.
217. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 171-80, 187-93, 211, and accompanying text.
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factor." 9 In both Transamerica and Kelsey-Hayes, the defendants had
little time to produce the requested documents, but the courts reached
opposite results. 220 These cases are illustrative of the unpredictability
of courts in deciding inadvertent disclosure issues under the cir-
cumstances analysis approach.22' Unpredictability in court decisions
is particularly deleterious in the attorney-client privilege context, since
the lack of certainty undermines the very purpose of the privilege.2
The purpose of the privilege is to encourage full disclosure of all rele-
vant circumstances by the client to the attorney. 223 If protection of
the privilege is uncertain, a client's disclosures ultimately will be in-
hibited. 224 Because of this uncertainty, and due to the importance of
the privilege involved, the circumstances analysis approach to deter-
mining whether a waiver of the attorney-client privilege should be
implied in inadvertent disclosure cases provides an undesirable standard.
The strict responsibility approach to deciding inadvertent disclosure
issues is viewed as too harsh, and has been rejected by most modern
courts. The analysis of the circumstances approach is similarly un-
satisfactory due to the lack of reliability and predictability in court
decisions. A third approach focusing on the client's intent to waive
the privilege augments the benefits of the attorney-client privilege while
solving the problem of harshness using the strict responsibility
approach, and the problem of unpredictability using the analysis of
the circumstances approach.
THE CASE FOR AN INTENT REQUIREMENT
California Evidence Code section 912(a) states that waiver occurs,
assuming no coercion has occurred, when (1) a significant part of
the confidential communication has been disclosed, or (2) the holder
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Unpredictability has been the impetus behind the movements to reform evidence law
in California. See Recommendation, supra note 102, at 30; see also supra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text.
222. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain [attorney-client]
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by
the courts, is little better than no privilege at all.").
223. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 317-35 and accom-
panying text.
224. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393; Note, supra note 22, at 611-12 n.57.
[Courts] have subjectively viewed situations after communications have been made,
and have then retrospectively determined whether the privilege should apply. In so
doing they have failed to provide objective guides for determining future conduct.
As a result, an attorney and his client have little to rely on when attempting to predict
whether a particular communication will be privileged.
Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
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has consented to disclosure made by anyone. 25 A court could find
a basis for using any of the three possible approaches to deciding
inadvertent disclosure cases in the language of section 912(a). 226 In
light of the unsatisfactory or unpredictable results of the two
approaches previously examined, the best approach to interpreting sec-
tion 912(a) would include a requirement of intent by the holder to
waive the attorney-client privilege. Definition of the standard of in-
tent is the first step in determining whether waiver has occurred.
A. The Standard of Intent
To determine if an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege
exists under section 912(a), a court could use either a standard focus-
ing solely on the client's subjective intent to waive the privilege, or
a standard in which the client's subjective intent is irrelevant. 227 A
purely subjective theory of intent would require a manifestation of
the client's subjective intent to waive the privilege before a waiver
could be found. 221 "Subjective" refers to whether the client waived
the privilege with knowledge that the privilege was being waived.
229
A determination of the plaintiff's knowledge would be made simply
on the basis of whether the client made a subjective manifestation
of intent to waive the privilege, such as a statement that the client
was waiving the privilege.230 While a subjective standard of intent is
theoretically possible, the self-interest of the client would raise signifi-
cant questions concerning the reliability of a client's statement that
225. CAL. EVID. CODE § 912(a).
226. See Jones v. Superior Court, 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 547, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148, 155 (1981)
(advocating a strict responsibility approach). Using an analysis of the circumstances approach,
a party could argue for a broad interpretation of coercion. The court could find that, due
to the circumstances, the party was, in effect, coerced into disclosure. See, e.g., Transamerica,
573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
227. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. I11. 1982)
("We are taught from first year law school that waiver imports the 'intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right."'); Dunn Chemical Co. v. Sybron Corp., 1975-2 Trade
Cas. 60,561, at 67,463 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
229. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (definition of a knowing waiver).
By contrast, an objective standard of intent would find irrelevant the fact that the privilege
was not knowingly waived. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co.,
314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970) (court refused to look behind the "objective fact" of
disclosure to determine whether the plaintiff really intended disclosure).
230. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 674 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (attorney explicitly advised the adverse party that no privilege was being claimed
on a set of documents). See also Note, supra note 22, at 610. "Under this [subjective manifesta-
tions] test, the client would testify that he did or did not intend the inadvertently disclosed
documents to remain private, and the court would accordingly deem the privilege waived or
preserved." Id.
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the privilege was not intended to be waived. 23' The client may have
intended to waive the privilege without subjective manifestation of
that intent.232 Inherent problems of reliability are present when deter-
minations of subjective intent are made.2 33 Therefore, a purely sub-
jective standard of intent is not the best alternative.
A standard in which subjective manifestations are irrelevant,
however, would be only slightly better than the unpredictable cir-
cumstances analysis approach.2 34 Since the client's subjective knowledge
is irrelevant, the trier of fact must look to objective indications of
the client's intent to waive the privilege." Thus, using either stan-
dard, the trier of fact would be viewing the totality of the circumstances
in making the determination. 23' The best approach is a combination
of the two standards. This corroborative standard would require both
objective and subjective manifestations of intent to waive the
privilege.2 37 The corroborative manifestations would increase the pro-
bability of a proper result in determining waiver issues. 238 The client's
subjective intent to waive the privilege, without any outward indica-
tion that the privilege was intended to be waived, is not enough to
constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.2 39 In addition, use
of a corroborative standard would focus the attention of the court
on one factor-the client's intent to waive the privilege-and would
therefore yield more consistent results in inadvertent disclosure cases. 40
The corroborative standard would enhance both reliability and predic-
tability of court decisions concerning inadvertent disclosure issues by
ensuring more consistent results.24'
231. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note I, § 2327, at 636 ("A privileged person would seldom be
found to waive, if his [subjective] intention not to abandon could alone control the situation.").
232. Note, supra note 22, at 611 n.54.
233. Id.
234. This standard of intent would consider circumstances relevant to the disclosure in deter-
mining the client's intent, such as voluntariness, precautions taken, and screening processes
used. See supra notes 163-224 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 163-214 and accompanying text.
237. See, e.g., Dunn Chemical, 1975-2 Trade Cas. at 67,463. In Dunn Chemical, the court
maintained the privileged status of letters referring to legal advice. Id. Objective manifestations
of intent to waive the privilege existed, since the documents had been disclosed to the adverse
party. Id. at 67,459. The court, however, due to the lack of any subjective manifestations
of the client's intent to waive the privilege, found that no valid waiver existed. Id. at 67,463.
238. See id. at 67,463 (interests of fairness are best served using the corroborative standard).
239. See Lohman v. Superior Court, 81 Cal. App. 3d 90, 95, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, 174 (1978)
(intent to waive, alone, does not constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege).
240. See supra notes 221-24 and accompanying text.
241. Id.
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B. Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.
An example of a court requiring the client's subjective intent to
waive the attorney-client privilege is found in the recent case of
Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co.242 In a patent infringement action,
plaintiff's attorney allowed defendant's attorney to inspect all files
of plaintiff's attorney listing plaintiff, Mendenhall, as the applicant.
243
Included in the files were four privileged letters that plaintiff's at-
torney did not intend defendent's attorney to inspect.244 When defense
counsel later requested copies of the letters, plaintiff's trial counsel
refused on attorney-client privilege grounds.245 Defense counsel then
sought an order to compel production of the letters, arguing that the
privilege had been waived by the inadvertent disclosure.24 6
Although the court noted that authority existed for the position
of defense counsel, the court denied the order. 247 The court held that
mere inadvertent production could not act as an implied waiver of
the attorney-client privilege.2"8 The court stated that waiver traditionally
is defined as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right.24 9 Inadvertent production, then, is the "antithesis" of
the concept of waiver. 20 The court stated that plaintiff's defense
counsel might have been negligent in producing the letters for inspec-
tion. 25' Negligence of defense counsel, however, was not enough to
find that the privilege had been waived.25 2 The court held that safe-
guarding the welfare of the client is too important to allow mere
negligence of defense counsel to impliedly waive the privilege.
253
242. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
243. Id. at 952; id. at 952 n.2.
244. Id. at 952 n.2.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 952.
247. Id. at 954.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 955. "We are taught from first year law school that waiver imports the 'inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right."' Id. (footnote omitted). The court also noted that
the United States Supreme Court had used this definition of waiver. Id. at 955 n.9 (citing
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Although Johnson dealt with the waiver of con-
stitutional rights, the court in Mendenhall believed that the definition applied to waiver generally.
Id.
250. Id. at 955.
251. Id. Plaintiff's counsel should have removed the letters from the files prior to inspec-
tion by defense counsel. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. "[I]f we are serious about the attorney-client privilege and its relation to the client's
welfare, we should require more than such negligence by counsel before the client can be deem-
ed to have given up the privilege." Id.
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C. History of Section 912(a)
Prior to 1964,24 the Law Revision Commission requested a study
relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, including waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.2" The study was to examine prior case law,
compare the law to the corresponding rule of the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, and make a recommendation to the Law Revision Com-
mission.256 The study was conducted by Professor James H. Chad-
bourn. 257 Results of the study indicated that prior California law was
in accord with the idea that a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
must be a knowing waiver. 258 The Chadbourn study stated that "It]he
thought probably is that waiver should depend upon intent to waive,
and, since intent requires knowledge, knowledge is an element of
waiver" (emphasis added).259 The Chadbourn study recommended to
the Commission that the new Evidence Code reject prior law and adopt
Wigmore's strict responsibility approach. 260  This view, however,
represented only the recommendation of Professor Chadbourn's study,
not the view of the Commission. 6' In the comments to section 912(a),
the Commission made no statement that would support a strict respon-
sibility approach. 262 Moreover, while the original draft of the com-
ments to Evidence Code section 912 included Chadbourn's recom-
mendation, subsequent versions excluded his recommendation,263 in-
254. California Evidence Code § 912(a) was enacted by the legislature in 1965 upon the
recommendation of the California Law Revision Commission. California Law Revision Com-
mission, Recommendation relating to Erroneously Ordered Disclosure of Privileged Informa-
tion, 11 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1165 (1973). See also 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 299,
§ 912, at 1323 (enacting § 912(a)).
255. California Law Revision Commission, Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating
to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Article V. Privileges, 6 CAL. L. REVISION CONIM'N REPORTS
301 n.* (1964) [hereinafter cited as Study]. Originally, the Commission was directed to deter-
mine whether California evidence law should be revised to conform with the Uniform Rules
of Evidence. 1956 Cal. Stat. Res. ch. 42, at 263; California Law Revision Commission, Ten-
fative Recommendation and a Study relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence, Article L General
Provisions, 6 CAL. L. REVISION CoNm'N REPORTS 3 (1964). The Commission recommended against
this revision. Recommendation, supra note 102, at 33. Instead, a new Evidence Code was recom-
mended, of which § 912(a) is a part. Recommendation, supra note 102, at 33-34.
256. See Study, supra note 255, at 301.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 510. Accord People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 100-01
(1954) (Shinn, P.J., concurring) (waiver should only be allowed when the client knowingly waives
the privilege).
259. Study, supra note 255, at 510.
260. Id. "It is recommended that Rule 37 [§ 912(1)] be amended to conform to the Wigmorean
view, deleting from the rule the requirement of knowledge." Id.
261. "The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained herein are entirely those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or recom-
mendations of the Law Revision Commission." Study, supra note 255, at n.*.
262. Evidence Code Comments, supra note 152, at 1153.
263. See Study, supra note 255, at 262 (original 1964 recommendation against a require-
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dicating that the Commission intentionally rejected Chadbourn's recom-
mendation. 64 Although the comments of the Law Revision Commis-
sion do not have the force of law, they are highly persuasive authori-
ty concerning legislative intent.165 The intentional omission by the Law
Revision Commission of Professor Chadbourn's study supports the
argument for an implied requirement of intent for section 912(a). The
history of Evidence Code section 912(a) supports the argument for
a requirement that the client must intend to waive the attorney-client
privilege. Cases involving the waiver of the physician-patient privilege
also support an intent requirement.
D. Analogy to the Physician-Patient Privilege
Analogizing to cases involving waiver of the physician-patient
privilege is helpful in examining the law concerning waiver of the
attorney-client privilege. Both the physician-patient privilege and the
attorney-client privilege share similar underlying rationales. 66 A pur-
pose of both privileges is to encourage full disclosure of relevant in-
formation to professionals.2 67 In addition, both privileges are justified
on a right to privacy rationale. 68 Perhaps the strongest reason for
ment of knowledge); Evidence Code Comments, supra note 152, at 1153 (final 1965 draft which
excluded recommendation against knowledge requirement).
264. In the tentative recommendation for what later became Evidence Code § 912, the Com-
mission included Professor Chadbourn's view that knowledge of the privilege should be irrele-
vant. Study, supra note 255, at 262. This view, however, was not adopted by the legislature
when § 912 was enacted. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 299, § 912, at 1323. According to the study,
existing California law required that the client intend to waive the privilege, specifically requir-
ing knowledge that the disclosed document was privileged. Study, supra note 255, at 510. The
final draft of the Evidence Code by the Law Revision Commission, the version enacted by
the legislature, excluded Chadbourn's recommendation that knowledge of the privilege be made
irrelevant. Evidence Code Comments, supra note 152, at 1153. Compare 1965 Cal. Stat. ch.
299, § 912, at 1323 (enacting the Evidence Code), with Evidence Code Comments, supra note
152, at 1001-1325. Since the Commission chose not to include a comment to the contrary,
existing law was intended to remain in force. See supra notes 262-63 and infra note 265 and
accompanying text.
265. The California Supreme Court often has referred to the Law Revision Commission
comments for support. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 32 Cal. 3d 60, 65-72,
646 P.2d 835, 838-43, 183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 676-81 (1982) (citing various California Law Revi-
sion Commission Reports). See also People v. Dillon, 34 Cal. 3d 441, 471, 668 P.2d 697, 715,
194 Cal. Rptr. 390, 408 (1983). "When a statute proposed by the California Code Commission
for inclusion in the Penal Code has been enacted by the Legislature without substantial change,
the report of the commission is entitled to great weight in construing the statute and determin-
ing the intent of the Legislature." Id.
266. Board of Medical Quality Assurance v. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d 669, 679, 156
Cal. Rptr. 55, 61 (1979) (physician-patient); see supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text
(attorney-client).
267. Gherardini, 93 Cal. App. 3d at 679, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 61; see supra notes 78-98 and
accompanying text.
268. See Article, supra note 65, at 479-84.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
analogizing between the two privileges in inadvertent disclosure cases
is that the law concerning implied waiver of a privileged communica-
tion through inadvertent disclosure includes decisions involving both
the attorney-client and the physician-patient privileges.169 Therefore,
a case involving implied waiver of the physician-patient privilege,
although decided prior to the enactment of section 912(a), may pro-
vide insight to analysis of implied waivers of the attorney-client
privilege.
Prior to the enactment of Evidence Code section 912(a) in 1965,
courts in three cases explicitly required that a patient intend to waive
the physician-patient privilege for an implied waiver to be found.270
In 1935, in Kramer v. Policy Holders Life Insurance Association,"7 '
a California appellate court held that while the physician-patient
privilege may be waived, the patient's intent to waive the privilege
must be clear.2 72 Plaintiff was the beneficiary of an insurance policy
in which his wife was the insured. 73 When the wife died the insurance
company refused to pay the plaintiff, due to some alleged misinfor-
mation regarding the wife's medical history, and plaintiff instituted
an action to recover payment. 27 At trial, the insurance company at-
tempted to introduce into evidence the testimony of a physician who
was present during one of the decedent's medical examinations.273 The
doctor was called to testify regarding the wife's medical history, and
plaintiff's counsel objected relying on the physician-patient privilege. 76
Defense counsel argued that the privilege had been waived because
the doctor was not the attending physician. Since the wife had made
269. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 912(a). Evidence Code § 912(a) is essentially a restatement
of California law prior to enactment of the Evidence Code in 1965. Recommendation, supra
note 102, at 34.
270. See Torbensen v. Family Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 329 P.2d 596 (1958);
Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 303 P.2d 839 (1956); Kramer v. Policy Holders Life
Ins. Ass'n, 5 Cal. App. 2d 380, 42 P.2d 665 (1935).
271. 5 Cal. App. 2d 380, 42 P.2d 665 (1935) (privileged information disclosed during a
medical examination in the presence of a third person).
272. Id. at 391, 42 P.2d at 670. "It must clearly appear... that there is such an intention
to waive, and a court will not run to such a conclusion." Id.
273. Id. at 381, 42 P.2d at 665. On the insurance application, the wife indicated that she
had undergone a minor operation on her breast, but was presently in good health. Relying
on the truth of these representations, the policy was issued. Id. Four months later, plaintiff's
wife was examined again at a clinic maintained by the Kellogg Foundation. Id. at 382, 42
P.2d at 666. During this examination, a Dr. Harris was present doing research for the Founda-
tion. Id. at 382-84, 42 P.2d at 666-67. Dr. Harris discovered that the wife's right breast had
been removed shortly before the insurance policy had been issued, that the cancer had spread
to her left breast, and that cancer had been in her system for more than two years. Id. at
382, 42 P.2d at 666. Dr. Harris also took the wife's medical history. Id.
274. Id. at 381, 42 P.2d at 665.
275. Id. at 382, 42 P.2d at 665.
276. Id. at 382, 42 P.2d at 666.
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confidential communications in the presence of a third person not
necessary for her treatment and diagnosis, the privilege had been im-
pliedly waived.277 The court sustained plaintiff's objection to the
testimony of the doctor on the grounds that the wife had not inten-
tionally waived the physician-patient privilege.27
In Newell v. Newell,279 decided in 1956, another appellate court
followed the holding of Kramer in upholding an objection to physi-
cian testimony.280 Plaintiff attempted to attack the credibility of the
defendant's husband by showing that he was homosexual and
amoral. 21' To ensure the accuracy of plaintiff's offer of proof,
however, the plaintiff needed a copy of a confidential report made
by the physician of the defendant's husband.28 2 The report had been
made by the doctor for the court in a different dispute involving defen-
dant's husband.2"3 On appeal the plaintiff argued that the informa-
tion was therefore no longer confidential.284 The appellate court relied
on the statute codifying the physician-patient privilege and upheld the
exclusion of the physician's testimony by the trial court.285 Citing
Kramer, the court held that the patient must intend to waive the
privilege.286 The court held that plaintiff's offer of proof did not in-
dicate a waiver had occurred. 2 7 The court also held that the physician-
patient privilege should be construed liberally in favor of the patient. 28
The third case, Torbensen v. Family Life Insurance Co.,2 s9 was
decided in 1958. The plaintiff, Torbensen, brought an action to recover
payment on a life insurance contract of which she was the
beneficiary. 290 The defendant refused to pay on the ground that the
insured had made false statements to-the examining physician.29" ' The
277. Id. at 384, 391, 42 P.2d at 666, 670.
278. Id. at 391-93, 42 P.2d 670-71.
279. 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 303 P.2d 839 (1956) (offer of proof calling for a physician's
disclosure of confidential information).
280. Id. at 178, 303 P.2d at 847.
281. Id. at 177, 303 P.2d at 847.
282. Id. at 176, 303 P.2d at 846.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 177, 303 P.2d at 847.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 178, 303 P.2d at 847.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 177, 303 P.2d at 847.
289. 163 Cal. App. 2d 401, 329 P.2d 596 (1958) (waiver was found when plaintiff signed
a waiver of privilege clause).
290. Id. at 402, 329 P.2d at 596.
291. Id. at 403, 329 P.2d at 597. The insured stated that he was in good health and free
from bodily impairment, that he had consulted another physician during the prior five years
for low blood pressure, that he did not have heart disease, and that he had never had an
electrocardiogram taken. At the time the application was completed, the insured was under-
going treatment for heart disease, and an electrocardiogram of the insured had been taken. Id.
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insured had signed a statement authorizing the release of any medical
information to defendant upon request.292 At trial, the defendant called
the examining physician to testify concerning the insured's condition
at the time the insurance was requested.293 On appeal, plaintiff argued
that the physician's testimony should have been excluded on the
grounds of confidential communication between patient and physi-
cian.294 The appellate court held that the physician-patient privilege
had been waived.2 95 The court relied upon the holdings in Kramer
and Newell as statements of the existing law on the subject of whether
intent is required to waive the physician-patient privilege.2 9 The court
then found that the statement signed by the insured authorizing
disclosure of any medical information by the examining physician was
an intentional waiver of the physician-patient privilege.297 According-
ly, the court upheld the admission of the testimony of the examining
physician.2 98 Thus, in the pre-1965 cases directly addressing the issue,
California courts required a patient's intent to waive the privilege to
find that a waiver had occurred.2 99
In a 1981 case concerning the issue whether intent is necessary for
an implied waiver of the physician-patient privilege, the appellate court
in Jones v. Superior Court00 held that intent to waive the privilege
was not necessary. 301 Jones involved a daughter's claim for damages
due to injuries resulting from her mother's ingestion of DES, a drug
suspected of causing birth defects. 0 2 In Jones, the mother testified
regarding circumstances surrounding the mother's ingestion of DES.30 3
The mother also testified, during a deposition, concerning her medical
history prior to the birth of her daughter.3 04 An issue was raised re-
292. Id. The statement read as follows: "I hereby authorize and request you to disclose
any and all information and records concerning my condition when under observation by you,
if requested to do so by [defendant]. Id.
293. Id. at 404, 329 P.2d at 597.
294. See id.
295. Id. at 404, 329 P.2d at 597-98.
296. Id. at 404, 329 P.2d at 598.
297. Id. "IT]he paragraph can only be interpreted to mean that the applicant was waiving
his privilege of having his physician remain mute as to matters learned during the course of
treatment of the applicant." Id.
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 270-98 and accompanying text.
300. 119 Cal. App. 3d 534, 174 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1981).
301. Id. at 550-51, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
302. Id. at 540, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 152. The daughter in Jones claimed injury caused by
her mother's ingestion of the drug DES (diethylstilbestrol) while plaintiff was in utero. Id.
The daughter was suing a number of pharmaceutical companies alleged to have manufactured
and distributed the drug. Id. at 540-41, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 152.
303. Id. at 542, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 152-53.
304. The mother's testimony included the doctor's administration of DES, but the mother
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garding whether the mother could be compelled to answer questions
concerning her DES-related medical history.3 °0 The questions includ-
ed communications between the mother and her doctor, which nor-
mally would be considered privileged communications.306 Defendants
argued that the physician-patient privilege had been waived due to
her testimony.3"7
The court in Jones held that the physician-patient privilege had been
waived as to those matters upon which the mother originally testified.3"8
The court focused upon whether the mother disclosed a significant
part of the privileged communications. 09 The court did not indicate
that intent was required to waive the privilege.3"' The decision on
the necessity of intent, however, went to the determination of the
scope of the waiver, rather than the existence of a waiver. 3" Jones,
therefore, does not stand for the proposition that intent should be
eliminated as a requirement to find an implied waiver of the physician-
patient privilege.
Since both the attorney-client privilege and the physician-patient
privilege have similar rationales, holdings concerning the latter may
be persuasive in cases involving the former. In Kramer and Torbensen,
objective manifestations of intent to waive the privilege existed, but
the courts required a subjective manifestation as well.31 2 Cases in-
volving the physician-patient privilege, therefore, indicate that a cor-
roborative standard of intent is warranted. Since the California Law
Revision Commission considered these cases in the Commission report
refused to disclose certain facts concerning her pregnancy, and refused to answer any questions
relating to her medical history after the birth of her daughter. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 542, 542 n.2, 174 Cal. Rptr. 152-53, 153 n.2. See also CAL. EVID. CODE §§
990-1007 (describing the physician-patient privilege).
307. 119 Cal. App. 3d at 546-47, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
308. Id. at 550-51, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
309. Id. at 546, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 155.
310. Id. at 547, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 155-56.
311. Id. "Defendants observe, and we agree, that the scope of waiver is not limited to
what the patient intends. . . ." Id. (emphasis added). The court cited a similar case, Kerns
Construction Co. v. Superior Court, for support. Id. See Kerns Constr. Co. v. Superior Court,
266 Cal. App. 2d 405, 414, 72 Cal. Rptr. 74, 79 (1968). In Kerns, the attorney for the defen-
dant had the witness refer to some privileged documents in order to refresh the witness' memory.
Id. at 413, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 78. The witness then testified to matters of which he had no
memory independent of the reports. The court held that the witness had given testimony from
the privileged reports, which were furnished with knowledge of the intended use. Thus, the
privilege was waived. Id. Testifying from a privileged document, however, easily fits into a
recognized exception to the attorney-client privilege. When a witness testifies regarding privileg-
ed communications, the privilege is waived. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. Thus,
Kerns should not be read as eliminating an intent requirement in finding an implied waiver
of the attorney-client privilege.
312. See supra notes 271-78, 289-99, and accompanying text.
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dealing with waiver of the attorney-client privilege, as well as in
drafting the language of Evidence Code section 912(a),313 section 912(a)
should include an implied requirement of intent. Thus, an implied
requirement that an individual must intend to waive the attorney-client
privilege is supported in the history of Evidence Code section 912(a),
as well as by analogy to cases involving the physician-patient
privilege. In addition, an intent requirement for waiver of the attorney-
client privilege is supported by sound policy considerations.
E. Policy Considerations
While detractors have existed in the past,3"" few today would sug-
gest complete abrogation of the attorney-client privilege. ' 5 Arguments
have been made, however, that the privilege is a barrier to the truth,
and should be defined narrowly.31 6 An analysis of both the concerns
and the advantages, however, will show that, overall, the attorney-
client privilege yields substantial benefits to society.
1. Benefits Promoted by a Corroborative Standard
The fundamental purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to en-
courage complete disclosure by the client to the attorney without fear
that the information will be disclosed.3"7 Full disclosure by the client
yields substantial benefits.3 '8 The client benefits by obtaining legal
advice without losing confidentiality.3"9 If confidentiality were not pro-
313. See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text.
314. M. DUMONT, supra note 6, at 246-47.
315. See, e.g., Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (the privilege is
indispensable); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 3, at 206 (society would be outraged at any attempt
to eliminate the privilege); Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege,
66 CALr. L. REv. 1061, 1062 (1978) ("[T]he issue concerning the attorney-client privilege is
not whether it should exist, but precisely what its terms should be.").
316. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554. E.g., Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046,
1049 (9th Cir. 1981) (privilege is strictly construed); Brunner v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 2d
616, 618, 335 P.2d 484, 486 (1959) (privilege to be strictly construed). But cf. People v. Flores,
71 Cal. App. 3d 559, 563, 139 Cal. Rptr. 546, 548 (1977) ("Although it has been suggested
to the contrary, the privilege has been and should be liberally construed."); People v. Kor,
129 Cal. App. 2d at 436, 447, 277 P.2d 94, 100-01 (1954) (Shinn, Vallee, JJ., concurring)
(privilege should be regarded as sacred).
317. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("Its [the attorney-client privilege]
purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice.");
People v. Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d 682, 690, 631 P.2d 46, 51, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612, 617 (1981)
("The fundamental purpose of the attorney-client privilege is, of course, to encourage full and
open communication between client and attorney."); 8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 543.
318. See infra notes 319-35 and accompanying text.
319. Note, supra note 22, at 600-01.
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tected, the client might be deterred from consulting with an attorney. 2
Thus, by ensuring confidentiality, the client is not deprived of effec-
tive consultation with an attorney.3 2' In addition, the client's privacy
rights are protected by preventing disclosure of the cnfidential in-
formation without the client's approval.322 The client, however, is not
the only beneficiary of the attorney-client privilege. Full disclosure
also aids the attorney by allowing the advice given to be based upon
all the relevant facts. 323 Further, the legal profession gains from full
disclosure.324 If the privilege did not exist, fewer individuals would
consult attorneys due to a fear that communications could later be
disclosed.325 Society also realizes benefits from the existence of the
attorney-client privilege, 26 in that the attorney helps the client comp-
ly with the law. 327 The public interest is served if citizens comply with
the law, and the result is decreased litigation.3 2  Litigation can be
avoided since the attorney will be able to judge the client's case on
all the merits, not just those the client is unafraid to disclose.32 9 Similar-
ly, general knowledge of the law is promoted by the attorney-client
privilege. 330 Therefore, clients, attorneys, and society realize signifi-
cant benefits from the existence of the attorney-client privilege.
320. See cases cited infra note 325.
321. In criminal cases, an individual has the right to consult with an attorney. U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15; CAL. PEN. CODE § 686.
322. See, e.g., Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613, 651-52 (1976) ("By providing individuals
with a tool to control the limits of the dissemination of personal information they choose to
disclose, testimonial privileges serve as important protectors of the right of privacy."); see also
Louisell, supra note 157, at 110-11 ("Primarily [privileges] . . . are a right to be let alone,
or a right to unfettered freedom, in certain narrowly prescribed relationships .. "); see generally
Article, supra note 7, at 1480-83.
323. Note, supra note 22, at 601.
324. See id. at 601 n.18.
325. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (legal advice can only be safely sought
when free from the consequences or apprehensions of disclosure); Permian Corp. v. United
States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (privilege assures the client that all statements
made in seeking legal advice will remain confidential) (quoting United States v. AT&T, 642
F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litig., 61 F.R.D. 453,
464 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (basis of the privilege is that confidentiality is necessary to promote the
attorney-client relationship); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358
(D. Mass. 1950) (privilege is a necessity to induce clients to make communications with attorneys).
326. See infra notes 327-35 and supra notes 317-25 and accompanying text.
327. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (attorney-client privilege "serves the overall public interest
in ensuring adequate legal representation for litigants and encouraging knowledge and com-
pliance with the law.").
328. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16
CALIF. L. REV. 487, 491 (1928).
329. Id.
330. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. at 640; see also Article, supra note 7,
at 1505-06.
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If a corroborative standard of intent to waive the attorney-client
privilege is used, clients will be assured that, under proper cir-
cumstances, confidential communications will remain confidential. 33 '
Clients will not be inhibited from fully disclosing relevant informa-
tion to the attorney.332 In addition, with corroborated intent to waive
the privilege as the analytical focus in inadvertent disclosure cases,
reliability and predictability in court decisions will be enhanced.333
Moreover, the attorney would be able to accurately advise the client
of what should be done to protect the privilege. 334 While the client,
the attorney, and society all realize benefits from the privilege, however,
the privilege may also result in a cost to society by excluding relevant
evidence from the trial.335
2. 'Concerns Raised by the Attorney-Client Privilege
Those who would limit the attorney-client privilege usually assert
two disadvantages associated with the privilege. The first is that the
trier of fact is precluded from viewing evidence that is relevant to
the proceeding. 36 This rationale, however, is not compelling. The
attorney-client privilege encourages full disclosure of information by
guaranteeing that the information will remain confidential. 337 If the
privilege did not exist, less information would be disclosed by the
client. 33 The United States Supreme Court has stated that operation
of the attorney-client privilege puts the adversary in no worse posi-
tion than if the communication had never taken place.339 Therefore,
the assertion that the attorney-client privilege results in a loss of
evidence is unfounded.
331. See infra notes 332-35 and accompanying text.
332. See Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. III. 1982). See
also supra note 325 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text.
334. If predictability in court decisions is enhanced, the attorney will better be able to predict
which actions will result in a loss of the privilege. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
335. See infra notes 336-44 and accompanying text.
336. See Article, supra note 7, at 1507-08.
337. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
338. See Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: One Value Among Many
or a Categorical Imperative?, 52 U. CoLo. L. REv. 349, 352 (1981). See also supra notes 222-24,
317-35, and accompanying text.
339. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395; see also Commission on Professional Responsibility, Roscoe
Pound-American Trial Lawyer's Code of Conduct Rule I comment (discussion draft 1980)
("If we were to remove that safeguard [the attorney-client privilege], by permitting lawyers
to divulge their clients' confidences, lawyers would come to have few truths to divulge at all.");
Saltzburg, Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REv. 597, 610
(1980) ("Because the same information might not exist were it not for the privilege, any loss
of information when the privilege is upheld may be more imagined than real." (footnotes
omitted)).
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The second asserted drawback of the privilege is that a dishonest
client will seek protection behind the privilege. 4 To prevent this abuse,
the crime-fraud exception to the privilege has developed." ' The
exception allows the attorney-client privilege to protect all but those
communications intended to further ongoing or future illegal activity. 342
Additionally, while the privilege is required to preserve a client's
confidences, an attorney is forbidden from using it to obstruct
justice.34 3 Attorneys are capable of serving their clients without lying
to the courts. Fear that dishonest clients will abuse the privilege
is not a significant concern, and therefore should not militate against
a requirement that intent be the analytical focus of courts in deciding
inadvertent disclosure issues.
CONCLUSION
Since inception, the attorney-client privilege has been regarded as
significant, and today the privilege is even more important. The
privilege has critics, however, and this dichotomy between proponents
and opponents of the privilege has resulted in three approaches to
resolving inadvertent disclosure issues. The harshest critics prefer the
strict responsibility approach to resolve issues raised by the acciden-
tal disclosure of privileged information. The approach, however, is
regarded by most judges and commentators as too severe. The analysis
of the circumstances approach is advocated by some courts, but the
results are unpredictable and unreliable. The third approach advocated
by courts focuses on whether the client intended to waive the privilege.
California Evidence Code section 912(a), defining waiver of the
attorney-client privilege, should be interpreted to require the client's
corroborated subjective intent to waive the privilege. Not only is
California Evidence Code section 912(a) amenable to the corroborative
standard, but the history of section 912(a), as demonstrated by the
California Law Revision Commission Reports and California case law,
340. See Article, supra note 7, at 1508; M. DUMONT, supra note 6, at 246-47.
341. CAL. Evn. CODE § 956; see generally Article, supra note 7, at 1509-14.
342. CAL. Evro. CODE § 956. See also supra notes 40 & 98 and accompanying text.
343. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6128(a) (attorney guilty of a misdemeanor for any deceit
or collusion with intent to deceive the court or any party); id. § 182 (conspiracy to obstruct
justice is illegal). See Meredith, 29 Cal. 3d at 693-95, 631 P.2d at 53, 175 Cal. Rptr. at 619
(privilege should not extend to cases in which counsel has altered or removed evidence).
344. Alschuler, The Search For Truth Continued, The Privilege Retained: A Response to
Judge Frankel, 54 U. CoLo. L. REV. 67, 79-80 (1982); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPON-
SIBIMTY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1979).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
indicates the propriety of the corroborative standard. Analogy to cases
of inadvertent disclosure of the physician-patient privilege lends further
support to this interpretation. A corroborative standard of intent to
waive the attorney-client privilege would promote the purpose and
benefits of the privilege, which is regarded as a significant and
necessary aspect of our legal system. The importance of the attorney-
client privilege demands that the privilege not be waived unless the
client has intended to waive the privilege. California courts should
therefore use the corroborative standard of intent in determining
whether the inadvertent disclosure of confidential communications will
act as an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege under section
912(a).
Wesley M. Ayres
